Recent Developments: State v. Jones: Temporary Administrative Suspension of Driver\u27s License Prior to a Drunk Driving Conviction Does Not Constitute Punishment under the Law of Double Jeopardy by Heydon, Beverly I.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 3 Summer 1996 Article 14
1996
Recent Developments: State v. Jones: Temporary
Administrative Suspension of Driver's License Prior
to a Drunk Driving Conviction Does Not
Constitute Punishment under the Law of Double
Jeopardy
Beverly I. Heydon
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heydon, Beverly I. (1996) "Recent Developments: State v. Jones: Temporary Administrative Suspension of Driver's License Prior to a
Drunk Driving Conviction Does Not Constitute Punishment under the Law of Double Jeopardy," University of Baltimore Law Forum:
Vol. 26 : No. 3 , Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss3/14











UNDER THE LAW 
OF DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
58 - U. Bait. L.F. /26.3 
In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in State v. Jones, 340 
Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), 
held that a temporary adminis-
trative suspension of a driver's 
license does not constitute pun-
ishment under the law of dou-
ble jeopardy. Section 16-205.1 
of the Transportation Article of 
the Annotated Code of Mary-
land provides for the temporary 
suspension of a driver's license 
if a driver who is suspected of 
being intoxicated, refuses to 
take a test to determine his or 
her blood alcohol concentra-
tion, or takes a test and has a 
blood alcohol concentration of 
0.10 or more. In upholding 
temporary license suspensions, 
the court found that the civil 
sanctions imposed by section 
16-205.1 do not violate a defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against double jeopardy 
or Maryland's common-law 
prohibition against double jeop-
ardy. 
On April 25, 1994, 
Ernest Jones, Jr. ("Jones") was 
arrested and charged with driv-
ing while intoxicated. After his 
arrest, he consented to a blood 
alcohol test which registered 
0.27. A hearing was held be-
fore the Motor Vehicle Admin-
istration ("Administration") and 
an administrative law judge 
(" ALJ") suspended Jones's 
driver's license for thirty days 
pursuant to section 16-205.1. 
On two prior occasions, Jones 
had been given probation be-
fore judgment for driving while 
intoxicated. 
After the administrative 
hearing, the District Court for 
Montgomery County found 
Jones guilty of driving while 
intoxicated. Jones appealed to 
the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County and filed a motion 
to dismiss the conviction based 
on double jeopardy principles. 
The circuit court granted Jones's 
motion and held that to prose-
cute him for driving while in-
toxicated, after his driver's li-
cense had been suspended by 
the Administration for the same 
reason, constituted double jeop-
ardy. The State appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, at which time the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari prior to re-
view by the intermediate appel-
late court. Upon review, the 
court of appeals reversed the 
judgment of the circuit court 
and remanded the case to that 
court for further proceedings. 
Chief Judge Murphy, 
delivering the opinion for the 
court of appeals, began his anal-
ysis by recognizing thatthe Fifth 
Amendmentto the United States 
Constitution protects individu-
als against double jeopardy. 
Jones, 340Md. at242, 666A.2d 
at 131. The Fifth Amendment 
provides, in part, "'nor shall 
any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb. '" Id. 
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 
Specifically, the Fifth Amend-
ment '''protects against three 
distinct abuses: a second pros-
ecution for the same offense 
after acquittal; a second prose-
cution for the same offense af-
ter conviction; and multiple 
punishments for the same of-
fense.'" Id. at 242,666 A.2d at 
131 (quoting United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 
(1989)). In the instant case, the 
court's inquiry focused upon 
the third of these abuses; wheth-
er the criminal prosecution of 
Jones for driving while intoxi-
cated, after the suspension of 
his driver's license for the same 
reason, constituted multiple 
punishments for the same of-
fense. Id. In resolving this 
issue, the court embarked on a 
detailed analysis ofthree recent 
Supreme Court decisions 
which, when taken together, 
have revised the test for decid-
ing what constitutes punish-
ment. 
First, the court of ap-
peals examined United States 
v. Halper, 490U.S.435 (1989), 
in which the government ini-
tially incarcerated and fined the 
defendant and subsequently 
sought to impose $130,000.00 
in additional civil penalties. Id. 
at 243, 666 A.2d 132 (citing 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 437). In 
Halper, the Court rationalized 
that the labels "criminal" and 
"civil" were no longer impor-
tant in determining punishment. 
Id. at 244, 666 A.2d at 132 
(citing Halper, 490 U. S. 446). 
Courts instead should evaluate 
the penalty and the purposes for 
imposing the penalty. Id The 
test applied in Halper was 
whether a statute "may be 'fair-
ly' said to be remedial ... or 
whether the civil penalty bears 
a 'rational relation' to the gov-
ernment's remedial goal." Id, 
at 244-45, 666 A.2d at 132 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
(quoting Halper, 409U.S.448-
49). The Supreme Court held 
that the civil tax penalty was a 
second punishment and there-
fore violated the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeop-
ardy. 
The court of appeals 
also reviewed the Supreme 
Court's holding in Austin v. 
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 
(1993). To determine whether 
a civil forfeiture law imposed 
punishment, the Court used the 
approach formulated in Halper, 
examining both the legislative 
history and historical use offor-
feitures to determine whether 
the law's effect was remedial or 
punitive. Id. at 245-46, 666 
A.2d at 133. The Austin court 
held that the civil forfeiture law 
in question was a second pun-
ishment, although it did so in 
the context of the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment, rather than the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 245, 
666 A.2d at 132-33 (citingAus-
tin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806). 
N ext, the court of ap-
peals considered Department of 
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). 
In Kurth Ranch, the Court held 
that the taxation of illegal drugs 
seized by the government con-
stituted punishment, when the 
tax equaled eight times the mar-
ket value of the drugs. Id. at 
246, 666 A.2d at 133 (citing 
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 
1948). The Court reasoned that 
the drug seizure was the first 
punishment and that the impo-
sition of the drug tax was a 
second punishment forbidden 
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Id. at 247,666 A.2d at 133. 
After careful examina-
tion of Halper, Austin, and 
Kurth Ranch, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland proceeded 
with its own analysis. The court 
recognized that licensing sys-
tems were historically designed 
to protect the public from indi-
viduals who, if unlicensed, 
might operate in an unscrupu-
lous or unskilled manner. Id. at 
251,666 A.2d at 136. In Mary-
land, for example, certain occu-
pations have established spe-
cific standards, such as the at-
tainment of a certain education-
al level or the passing of an 
examination, before persons can 
practice in those fields. Id. at 
252, 666A.2dat 136. The court 
emphasized that the procedures 
through which licenses are re-
voked or suspended have the 
remedial purpose of preventing 
a wrongdoer "from engaging in 
an activity when there is reason 
to believe they may perform the 
activity unsafely." Id. at 254, 
666 A.2d at 137. Specifically 
focusing on the language and 
structure of section 16-205.1, 
the court decided that the stat-
ute's purpose did not differ from 
other types of license suspen-
sions. Id. at 254-55, 666 A.2d 
at 137. The court explained that 
if the public would be endan-
gered by offending drivers keep-
ing their licenses, revocation or 
suspension is in accord with the 
policy of maintaining safety on 
public highways. Id. at 255, 
666 A.2d at 138. 
_______________________ 26.3 / U. Bait. L.F. - 59 
In rejecting Jones's ar-
gument that section 16-205.1 
was punitive in nature, the court 
scrutinized whether the statute 
served the remedial purpose of 
removing drunk drivers from 
Maryland's roads. Id. at 256, 
666 A.2d at 138. The court 
deduced that because Jones had 
a prior history of driving while 
intoxicated, there was a reason-
able basis on which the State 
would fear that he might again 
drive while intoxicated. !d. 
Thus, section 16-205.1 was not 
punitive but instead served the 
remedial purpose of keeping 
dangerous drivers offthe roads. 
Similarly, the court re-
j ected Jones's argument that the 
legislature intended section 16-
205.1 to be solely punitive. Id. 
at 257, 666 A.2d at 139. Al-
though section 16-205.1 was 
amended in 1989 to include 
longer time periods for license 
suspensions and to reduce an 
ALl's discretion to modify such 
decisions, the legislature did not 
intend the statute to have only a 
punitive effect. Id. at 258, 666 
A.2dat 139. The changes mere-
ly supported the legislature's 
intent of deterring persons who 
might drive while drunk and 
reducing "fatalities caused by 
drunk drivers who drive while 
awaiting. criminal adjudica-
tion." !d. at 259, 666 A.2d at 
139. Thus, the court concluded 
that in adopting the amendments 
to section 16-205.1, the legisla-
ture was motivated by both pu-
nitive and remedial purposes. 
Id. at 261,666 A.2d at 141. 
The court also disagreed 
wi th Jones's contention that the 
60- U. Bait. L.F. /26.3 
sanctions imposed by section 
16-205.1 are severe enough to 
be considered punishment. Id. 
at 262,666 A.2d at 141. Distin-
guishing Jones from Kurth 
Ranch, where the Supreme 
Court decided that the imposed 
tax was "remarkably high," the 
court rationalized that the for-
ty-five day or one year maxi-
mum suspension provided by 
section 16-205.1 was simply 
neither "remarkably high" nor 
severe enough to be considered 
punishment. Id. at 263, 666 
A.2d at 141. Judge Murphy 
noted that "the interests ad-
vanced in removing drunk dri v-
ers from the highways 'are of 
such a nature and importance to 
society in general that the in-
convenience occasioned by the 
temporary suspension of driv-
ing privileges pales by compar-
ison. '" Id. at 263, 666 A.2d at 
141 (quoting City of Columbus 
v.Adams,461 N.E.2d887,890 
(Ohio 1984)). 
In applying the holdings 
in Halper, Austin, and Kurth 
Ranch to the case at bar, the 
court abandoned its prior ap-
proach of focusing upon wheth-
er a proceeding was criminal or 
civil in nature. Id. at 242, 666 
A.2d at 131. While none of the 
three cases provided a system-
atic approach, each was based 
upon the Halper test which fo-
cused on a statute's remedial 
nature. Applying 'Halper to 
Jones, the court explained that 
the remedial purpose of main-
taining safety on Maryland's 
public highways justified the 
license suspension imposed by 
section 16-205.1. !d. at 265, 
666 A.2d at 142. 
The court concluded by 
finding that Jones's prosecu-
tion for driving while intoxicat-
ed was not barred under Mary-
land's common-law prohibition 
against double jeopardy, be-
cause Maryland's doublejeop-
ardy protection can be overrid-
den by statute. !d. at 266, 666 
A.2d at 143. Thus, if the court 
accepted Jones's assertion that 
the legislature intended to pun-
ish him, the court would find 
that section 16-205.1 overruled 
the common-law double jeop-
ardy protection. Id. 
State v. Jones is the first 
occasion where the court of 
appeals directly addressed a 
Fifth Amendment double jeop-
ardy challenge to a civil sanc-
tion since the Kurth Ranch de-
cision in 1994. In Jones, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
ruled that temporary adminis-
trative suspension of a driver's 
license does not constitute pun-
ishment under the law of dou-
blejeopardyorunderMaryland 
common law. The court's deci-
sion allows the State to deny 
driving privileges to those who 
drive drunk, while also pursu-
ing criminal sanctions. Over-
all, the ruling keeps potentially 
dangerous drivers off the roads, 
which in turn maintains safety 
onMaryland's public highways. 
- Beverly Heydon 
